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Law Reform and Legal Education
Robert E. Keeton*
I.

INCREASING ACTIVITY IN LAW REFORM

Painfully slow as the mills of law reform grind, they have moved
faster in our generation than in most. This appraisal may seem overly
generous to our own day when we reflect on the difficulties and delays
encountered in achieving some particular reform. But if we measure
progress in another way--comparing what has happened in the last
dozen years with what happened in other time periods of similar
length--differences emerge.
The most easily documented difference concerns the performance of
appellate courts of last resort in reforming private law by candidly
overruling precedents. In the last dozen years, there have been more than
100 overruling decisions in the area of tort law alone. This innovative
activity has extended to other areas of law as well, though perhaps in
fewer instances, and it reflects a very different general attitude among
appellate judges toward their role in law reform. More precisely, it
reflects a different attitude on the part of some judges in some courts.
For although a slight majority of the courts of last resort in the United
States have participated in this movement, less than a majority have
rendered more than one major overruling decision. Surely we cannot
regard that performance as spectacularly innovative. Yet it is cause for
credit-or possibly blame, depending upon one's perspective-that the
pace of judicial law reform has been somewhat faster since the late
1950's than it had been before.
II.

LAW REFORM IN THE CLASSROOM

Much of the credit for what has been happening recently in
appellate courts of last resort should be ascribed to the law schools of
earlier decades; law students of the thirties and forties have become
appellate judges of the sixties. Perhaps in those earlier decades professors
of law in general tended to be more reform-minded than students of the
law, who were by-and-large avidly preparing for careers that offered not
only the fulfillment and satisfaction of professional life but also a
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measure of security against the impact of economic crisis-a matter
much on our minds as we emerged from the great depression and later
from the disruptions of war. But students tended to be optimists about
the prospects for building a better world and receptive to thoughtful
proposals for change. Professorial criticism of the rigidity of the system
of precedent as then administered found its mark in fertile minds.
Seeds planted in those earlier times have just come to flower. That,
of course, is one way and perhaps the most significant way in which law
schools participate in law reform. Just as the appellate court's greatest
contribution to the development of law has been the daily interstitial
work rather than the overruling decisions to which I adverted earlier, the
law schools' major contribution to substantive law reform has been that
kind of sound legal education in which students are stimulated to study
and evaluate in a constructively critical way the key ideas of the legal
system and all of its principles and rules.
Against this backdrop of great credit to our elder statesmen in the
law school fraternity-and to those of our judicial alumni in whose
performance we see, through our lenses, indisputable proof of the
excellence of their legal education-we may appropriately consider what
more the law schools might do to contribute to law reform in the years
ahead. Alert to the fact that the law with which law students must deal in
the future will differ in many respects from the law of the past and
present, we constantly remind ourselves that we are not just teaching
substantive law in our substantive law courses. What we are doing, we
often say, is teaching students how to think about substantive law.
Curiously, however, when in our substantive law courses we focus on the
areas that need modification, it has been our common practice to talk
much about the substantive need for reform and little about the
processes of reform. If we are faithful to the idea that we should teach
not just doctrine itself but also how to deal with problems in a thoughtful
incisive way, then we should teach not just the needs for substantive law
reform but, as well, how to understand and deal incisively with the
processes of reform. We should be preparing students to deal with law
reform issues of the future and not just those of the present.
If we sometimes find ourselves discouraged about the prospects of
our making a contribution to the prompt achievement of substantive law
reform, there is at least one area in which we can immediately do
something positive-in the effectiveness of our courses as stimulants to
constructive thought among students. The attitudes and ideas on law
reform that we present to students will set a model for their
consideration. Some of our students may make that model their own,
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and even improve upon it. This opportunity of the law teacher to
encourage an open-minded and constructively critical point of view
toward law reform proposals and processes has special significance
because as a student one is likely to be relatively free of the ideological
vested interests that may come to exercise a compelling influence on his
judgment in later years-an influence that is real-even though he acts
with the greatest of good faith.
Even that rare man who recognizes that he is opposing needed
change because it threatens his economic interests finds it much easier to
fight hard when he can do so on the basis of an ideological as well as
financial concern. The effect of the ideological interests on one's attitude
toward reform is dramatically illustrated in a comment I heard another
speaker make recently in a panel discussion concerning automobile insurance reform. Be warned that I am suspected of having a bias on this
subject. But perhaps you can take without serious discount my report of
the observation of another. In substance, it went this way: "Why would
you expect trial lawyers to respond any differently than they have?
Would you expect a successful lawyer who for 25 years has been engaged
in the trial of personal injury cases and other litigation as a major part
of his professional life to stand up and say that the activity to which he
has devoted his skill and energy is a key part of the high overhead cost of
a compensation system that is too inefficient and wasteful to serve the
best interests of society?"
Part of the argument in favor of reforming our automobile
insurance system is that the present system is wasteful as well as unfair
and that the activities of lawyers within the system-though proper,
respectable and necessary within such a system-are from a larger
perspective not responsive to the public interest. If the argument is
sound, where will the impetus for its recognition originate? It is not
likely to come from the trial bar. And I make this assertion not because
of their economic interests, but because of the trial bar's vested
ideological interests. This illustration emphasizes the point that one of
the major contributions law teachers can make to law reform is to take
time in teaching to focus upon law reform and law reform processes.
To make this vague generalization more concrete, let us resort to
the painfully slow but pleasurable process we call the case method,
focusing on Bissen v. Fujii.1 A sequence of four events led to this exotic
Hawaiian litigation. First, on November 12, 1966, the plaintiff, Bissen,
and the defendant, Fujii, were involved in an intersection accident-a
I. 466 P.2d 429 (Hawaii 1970).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

very ordinary, if not pedestrian, start for litigation. Secondly, on March
1, 1968, the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided the very interesting case
of Loui v. Oakley, 2 in which the issue was the proper allocation of
liability for personal injuries resulting from successive incidents over the
course of several years, rather than merely successive impacts in one
incident. Refusing to burden the plaintiff with proving the amount of the
injury allocable to each incident or to treat all defendants as joint
tortfeasors, the court did a bit of innovating and adopted a rule
permitting rough apportionment of damages among the successive
tortfeasors. In a pregnant footnote to the opinion, Justice Levinson,
writing for the court, indicated that he thought it might be time for the
court to reconsider the judge-made rule that contributory fault is a
complete bar in personal injury actions. 3 Of course he cited the Illinois
Court of Appeal's opinion in Maki v. Frelk,4 which adopted a
comparative negligence rule for Illinois. At the time Loui was decided,
the Illinois Supreme Court's reversals of the Court of Appeal's decision
in Maki had not yet occurred.
The third item in the sequence of events leading to the Bissen
decision was the filing of the plaintiff's case on July 25, 1968, over four
months after the Loui decision. The defendant claimed that contributory
negligence was a complete bar. Relying upon Justice Levinson's
footnote, the plaintiff moved to strike the contributory negligence
defense on the ground that the applicable rule in Hawaii was
comparative negligence. The trial court denied the motion, and the
plaintiff's interlocutory appeal from that denial eventually brought the
case before the state supreme court. Meanwhile a fourth significant event
had occurred. In its 1969 session, the Hawaii Legislature had adopted
the "Wisconsin" or "limited" form of comparative negligence.' Under
this rule, the plaintiff loses if he is 50 percent negligent, but if he is 49
percent negligent he is entitled to 51 percent of his damages. If he is still
less negligent, he recovers proportionately more. The 1969 Act contained
a clause making the new law applicable only to those claims accruing
after its effective date.
The four events leading to the Bissen decision were, then, in this
order: (1) the accident;(2) the decision and pregnant footnote in Loui; (3)
2. 50 Hawaii 260,438 P.2d 393 (1968).
3. "It may be time to reconsider the applicability of the doctrine of contributory negligence, a
judge-made rule, in light of the mores of the day." Id. at 265 n.5, 438 P.2d at 397 n.5.
4. 85 I11.App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
5. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Il1. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
6. HAW. REV. STAT. § 666-31 (Supp. 1969).
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the filing of the pleadings in Bissen; and (4) the adoption by the
legislature of comparative negligence in its limited form. There are three
major positions that the state supreme court might have taken in
deciding the Bissen case; each is suggested in at least one of the reported
opinions. The supreme court could have affirmed the trial court, holding
in effect that the old law applied to the case and that contributory fault
was a complete defense. On the other hand, it could have adopted the
pure form of comparative negligence, as suggested by Justice Levinson's
footnote, for application to cases arising before the effective date of the
comparative negligence statute. It should be noted at this point that
when a law is changed a temporal inequity occurs because cases up to a
certain date are decided by one rule and otherwise identical cases of the
next day are decided by a different rule. This is part of the price we pay
for change. Adopting the second position, however, would result in two
temporal inequities-the first caused by the transition from contributory
negligence to pure comparative negligence, and the second by the
transition from pure comparative negligence to the limited form created
by the legislature. The third position open to the court was to adopt the
limited form of comparative negligence. In that way the court would
create no greater temporal inequity than the legislature had already
created, and the result would at least be closer to what they might
7
consider the ideal rule than is the old contributory negligence rule.
By a vote of four-to-one the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the
trial court and applied the old contributory negligence rule. Justice
Levinson, the single dissenter, though pointing out arguments for the
third position, chose the second because of the weight that he accorded
the unequal treatment inherent in the limited form of comparative
negligence. He was referring not to the temporal inequity but to the
unequal treatment of the 49 percent and 51 percent negligent plaintiffs.
He considered this inequity so grave and irrational that he not only chose
the pure form of comparative negligence over the "limited" rule but also
suggested that the statutory "limited" rule may violate the equal
protection clauses of the federal and Hawaii constitutions. Thus, this
7. At this point in this paper, as it was presented orally at the Southeastern Conference of
Law Teachers, a poll of the audience was taken. When asked to predict the decision of the court, the
audience was almost evenly divided between predicting adherence to the rule that contributory fault
is a complete bar and predicting application of a rule of limited comparative negligence like that of
the 1969 statute. Only one person predicted application of a "pure" comparative negligence rule.
When asked to indicate how they would have voted if members of the court themselves, the number
favoring application of a limited comparative negligence rule like that of the 1969 statute increased

to about three-fifths of those voting.
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dissent suggests not only that its writer is a little further along the road
to participation in law reform than his brethern on the court but also
that he may be willing to invoke constitutional grounds for this
particular innovation.
This illustration has been a long and perhaps dilatory way of getting
around to the main point I want to make. Since most of us now agree
that substantive change is needed in the law of contributory negligence,
what was once an argument over substantive law has become primarily
an argument over process. The contributory-comparative negligence
segment of the torts course is enlivened, I think, by introducing this
problem of legal process along with the discussion of substantive law.
These two things are closely intertwined, and by discussing them
concurrently we can better prepare our students for the practice of the
future.
It has become perfectly apparent that in the appellate and trial
practice of the future the lawyer will have to be alert to the possibility of
the court's abruptly changing the law. At the time I was trying personal
injury cases during the forties and early fifties, we did not argue in
appellate briefs that the court ought to overrule a decision that we
disliked. We did our best to distinguish the decision, and even if we
hoped that it might be overruled, we did not think it wise to appeal to the
court on that basis. Today, however, many briefs argue that an existing
rule of law is bad, that other jurisdictions have already abandoned it,
and that it should be discarded by the instant court. If this is to be part
of the daily appellate practice in some cases, we are not adequately
preparing our students for that practice if we fail to deal with the legal
processes of law reform as well as its substantive issues.
At this point, I pause for what may seem a diversion-to make two
things clear lest contrary inferences be drawn. The first is that for some
time now some of our colleagues in law teaching have been offering
excellent legal process courses. I am not suggesting that there is any
general deficiency in that respect. I am saying, however, that the focus
on process should occur in substantive law courses simultaneously with
the focus upon substantive issues. Both the process courses and the
substantive courses would be improved thereby. The second point is that
I am not prescribing how courses should be taught. Nor am I addressing
my remarks to the relative merits of the various accommodations that
exist in different law schools with respect to the extent to which the
faculty as a whole undertakes by persuasion, sanction, appointments
policy, or in some other way to influence the subject matter and
pedagogy of various courses. I am only suggesting that each professor
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might appropriately re-examine what he is teaching in his substantive
courses from the point of view of seeking an opportunity to do
something that may be useful and exciting and may improve the courses.
There may be courses in which the process of reform should not be
treated, and there may be professors by whom it should not be taught.
Diversity within a faculty and within a curriculum has advantages. I
urge simply that we engage in re-evaluation.
There is much material to choose from that is less exotic than
Bissen-cases that do not pose such intricate points and would not take
so much time for classroom analysis. Less complex cases abound in torts
and can be found in other subjects as well. For example, changes in the
law of nuisance pose good issues for property and torts courses.
Controversy regarding the relationship among the Uniform Commercial
Code, other statutes, and the concept of strict liability in tort has created
good issues for contracts and torts courses. There is a very interesting
sequence of Tennessee cases currently developing on the subject of what
limitations statute should apply to claims for personal injury based on
strict liability or breach of warranty. 8 Each of these areas of
development offers an opportunity for a focus on the process of reform
simultaneously with the study of the substantive law.
Although we have been discussing what we as law teachers can do,
the specific illustrations of law reform to which we have referred thus far
concern reforms effected by judges in appellate opinions. Our principal
contributions to such reforms are made indirectly through education.
Turn now to what law teachers and law schools may do in the classroom
to aid the kind of reform that is accomplished by the enactment of a
statute.
I submit that by failing in our substantive courses to focus on
the problems of drafting a law reform statute we have been missing a
grand opportunity for incisive education. Such a focus dramatically
presents the relationships among issues of policy, administration, and
doctrine. Of course, part of the difficulty here is that a comprehensive
problem-automobile insurance reform, for example-is too large.
Unless we select representative issues and work on them within some
assumed framework, we will find ourselves dealing superficially with a
multitude of issues. But there are many not-so-complex problems-the
drafting of a comparative negligence statute, for example-that may
lend themselves readily to classroom use.
8. A recent case in the series is Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 455 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1970);
see Note, Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23
VAND. L. REv. 775 (1970).
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The argument is often made that comprehensive law reform cannot
be effectively accomplished by courts on a case-by-case basis. In the
Vanderbilt Law Review's symposium on the comparative negligence
problem, 9 Professor Leflar made a distinctive contribution when he
collected comparative negligence statutes and analyzed them to
determine the extent to which they left questions of detail to the courts."'
Leflar found that every statute enacted has left questions of major
significance unanswered. When we focus sharply and incisively on
legislation, we begin to see that even when the prime source of reform is a
statute, much is still left to the cooperation and participation of the
courts. Recognizing this, we begin to ask how precise the framework
should be and to what extent some questions should be deliberately left
to the courts. This is a useful and instructive technique for examining
issues of substantive law reform, and it can be utilized within any course
in the curriculum.
III.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO LAW REFORM

This article has focused primarily on the contributions to law
reform that a law professor can make through his teaching. I would not
wish to be understood, however, as either discouraging or downgrading
the many other kinds of contributions to law reform that law teachers,
law students, and law schools have opportunities to make. I do wish to
suggest briefly what some of these opportunities are and what special
problems they may raise for law schools and their personnel.
Few, if any, would question the propriety of an individual's
engaging in law reform activity, including lobbying, "on his own time."
And most would agree that if he makes it clear that he speaks only as an
individual and not for an institution, he should have this freedom even
though he happens to be a professor of law, a student of law, or even a
dean.
Questions of propriety quickly surface, however, when we consider
institutional encouragement or support for the law reform activities of
the institution's faculty, or its students. I suppose that as long as
participation is limited to study and research, everyone would agree that
it is proper. Even though it may be difficult to draw the fine line between
educating and engaging in a propaganda campaign to influence
legislation, I suppose most people would agree that the dissemination of
9. James, Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone & Wade, Comments on Maki v.
Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21
VAND. L. REv.889 (1968).
10. Id. at 920-27.
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results of faculty or student research is proper. Also surely it is proper to
place those results before students as part of the course materials when
the subject matter is within the scope of the course. But I suppose also
that institutional funds and facilities should not be used, for example, for
a professor's campaign for enactment of a draft statute that his research
has led him to recommend. Where is the line to be drawn between these
different means of spreading information about his research and
recommendations? Any single law professor, and a fortiori any group,
can quickly devise a spectrum of hypotheticals for which answers will be
debatable.
In recent years, our institutions have become more sensitive to these
problems. As much in a spirit of confession as in a spirit of rectitude,
however, we may observe that the prime reason for concern has not been
excessive zeal of the members of our faculties in law reform activities.
More often we have been troubled by the controversial activities and
proposals of our students. Even when we can persuade them, or most of
them, that preserving the freedom of the university from political
controls is a higher value than any that can be realized by using the
university for political ends, we encounter difficulties in formulating
useful guidelines for the institution and its faculty and students.
Obviously there are some limitations. It is rather clear, I believe,
that the institution itself should not be behind a law reform movement. It
probably should not even be behind a movement for reform in judicial
administration. I can see that one might distinguish between the interest
of a law school in reforming the administration of the law and its interest
in reforming the substantive law itself. But I question the validity of the
proposition that administrative reform is severable from substantive
reform. I doubt that there is any reform in judicial administration that
dos not impinge upon some vested economic or ideological interest.
Once you start advancing a proposal that impinges upon those vested
interests, you are engaged in politics. One thing seems clear to me; in
order to preserve some of the highest values of the whole system of legal
education, we must keep the law schools out of politics.
Time imposes its limitations too. And even within those bounds in
which one can appropriately say he is using "his own time," there are
problems of another kind. One must be concerned about entanglements
that may affect his objectivity. Today some of us are tempted with
opportunities to write for a fee, or an honorarium if you please, in
support of special groups and points of view. Even when one accepts
such an invitation, believing that the point of view he expresses is entirely
consistent with his own, I think he has to be concerned about whether the
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entanglements may in the long run affect his judgment and impair his
usefulness both as a teacher and as a contributor to law reform.
These remarks barely suggest the nature of the problems we
encounter, as law teachers, when we become involved in that type of law
reform activity that looks to statutory enactments. There is one further
problem that it seems appropriate to note-a problem we must
encounter even in a modest undertaking to focus now and then on issues
of law reform in our teaching. Surely we should attempt to be as
constructively critical of a student's proposal with which we heartily
disagree as we are of one with which we have sympathy. We should
demand that of ourselves. In consequence, we will sometimes stimulate
ideas that we heartily dislike. But that, I suppose, is the fate of any good
teacher.

